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INTRODUCTION 
Money laundering has traditionally been thought of as the 
transformation of tainted money in order to make it appear to have come 
from a legitimate source.  One way to do this is to conceal or disguise 
money in order to make it harder to trace the proceeds back to their illicit 
origins.  Federal money laundering charges are controlled by the 
companion statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957.  It makes a difference what 
section of the money laundering statute the government brings charges 
under.  There are a number of money laundering charges contained within 
the statute including, among others, using the proceeds of unlawful activity 
to promote further crime or knowingly participating in a transaction to 
avoid a reporting requirement under state or federal law.1  Specifically, 
concealment money laundering is described as transactions involving illicit 
proceeds executed “to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful 
activity[.]”2  Evidence of concealment must be substantial.3  While it is not 
necessary to prove intent to conceal in order to convict someone of money 
laundering in general, it is necessary to prove intent to get a conviction for 
concealment money laundering.4  Therefore, in order to bring a successful 
concealment money laundering charge, prosecutors must show that (1) “the 
property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
form of unlawful activity”5 and (2) the defendant knew that the transaction 
was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, 
source, ownership, or control of the unlawful proceeds.6  The terms design 
and intent can be equated in this context because the statute makes clear 
that a scheme must have been intended to conceal the proceeds or designed 
in such a manner that concealment was the scheme’s intention. 
 
 1.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (B)(ii) (2014) (containing a list of charges 
associated with money laundering). 
 2.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2014). 
 3.  United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 4.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (b)(1) (2014) (creating money laundering liability for 
individuals knowingly transporting illegal proceeds). 
 5.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (2014).   
 6.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (2014). 
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Concealment money laundering can be accomplished in a number of 
ways.  One common method of concealment money laundering is to place 
the tainted funds in another person’s name.  Indeed, courts have found that 
“a design or intent to conceal the nature, the source, or the ownership of 
unlawfully obtained proceeds may be inferred when a defendant transfers 
those proceeds into the control of others with whom the defendant has a 
very close relationship.”7  Intent to conceal can also be inferred from the 
use of unlawful proceeds to buy assets in another person’s name.8  Some 
courts have even found defendants guilty of money laundering when they 
transferred funds between accounts in the defendants’ own names.9  This 
interpretation is not unreasonable given that it is not necessary for a 
defendant to completely remove all traces of his or her involvement in 
order to satisfy the design or intent element.10  However, the judicial 
circuits have applied divergent standards in determining what kinds of 
transfers constitute concealment money laundering.  While courts have no 
problem agreeing over what constitutes the proceeds of an unlawful 
activity, the circuits have split as to what types of acts permit an inference 
of intent to conceal. 
In some circuits, the act of putting unlawful proceeds in a third party’s 
name on its own is sufficient to demonstrate intent to conceal.  For 
example, the Tenth Circuit has reasoned that: 
[W]hile a showing of simply spending money in one’s own name 
will generally not support a money laundering conviction, using a 
third party, for example, a business entity or a relative, to 
purchase goods on one’s behalf or from which one will benefit 
usually constitutes sufficient proof of a design to conceal.11 
Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit seems more interested in whether the 
funds were actually more concealed as a result of the transfer: 
[A] money laundering concealment conviction . . . requires 
evidence of something more than a simple transfer of funds 
between two accounts, each bearing the parties’ correct name.  
 
 7.  United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000).  See also United 
States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1387 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A] transfer from one third party to 
another supports a reasonable inference of a design to conceal because it moves the money 
further away from the defendant than it was before the transfer.”). 
 8.  United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 9.  See, e.g., United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
the defendant could be found guilty of money laundering even though he used his own name 
and made no effort to conceal his identity in the transactions forming the basis of the money 
laundering charges). 
 10.  Willey, 57 F.3d at 1386. 
 11.  Willey, 57 F.3d at 1384–85 (describing the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in United States 
v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
ARTICLE 6 (WANG) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  3:02 PM 
258 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:1] 
 
There must be some evidence that the funds are more concealed 
after the transaction is completed than before.  Decisions by our 
sister circuits also support this conclusion.12 
It is important to note that 18 U.S.C. § 1956 is a money laundering 
statute and not a money spending statute.  Merely spending unlawful 
proceeds does not automatically provide a basis for a money laundering 
conviction.  “[I]t is the concealing or disguising of the funds and not their 
spending that is prohibited by” § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).13  Furthermore, putting 
funds or buying assets in another’s name is also not illegal on its own; but 
when considered alongside other legal but suspicious activities, it can give 
rise to an inference of money laundering.14 
This Paper analyzes the current circuit split on what constitutes 
concealment money laundering.  Specifically, it considers whether the 
Supreme Court’s novel money laundering decision in Regalado Cuellar v. 
United States, which set a more stringent standard for what is sufficient for 
an intent to conceal, has altered this split at all.15  Part I of this Paper will 
give a brief overview of the legislative history of the money laundering 
statutes.  Part II explores the circuit split regarding the standard of proof 
necessary to convict someone of concealment laundering and the different 
grounds upon which defendants had been convicted before the Cuellar 
decision.  Part III describes the case Regalado Cuellar v. United States and 
its impact on how courts must now conduct their analysis in concealment 
money laundering cases.  Part IV looks at cases that were decided after 
Cuellar and how courts’ approaches have and also have not changed.  
Finally, Part V recommends that (1) courts should continue to look at the 
traditional indicators of concealment as a starting point, (2) circumstantial 
evidence ought to be allowed to show inferred intent but it must be paired 
with “objective” evidence as well, and (3) courts need to more strictly 
follow Cuellar, despite the holding’s issues, in order to maintain 
consistency in concealment money laundering case law and to adhere to the 
primary purpose of the statute. 
 
 12.  United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 13.  MARVIN G. PICKHOLZ ET AL., Types of Violations, 21 SECURITIES CRIMES § 6:19 
(Database updated November 2014).  See also Money Laundering, EXEC. LEGAL SUMMARY 
53 (Database updated June 2015) (“An intent to conceal is commonly found where the 
defendant uses a false name or shell corporation to hide his or her identity.  This 
requirement may also be met where third parties are involved to conceal the funds.  
However, the buying of personal goods alone does not show an intent to conceal.”). 
 14.  Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 173, 178 (1996).  
 15.  Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008). 
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I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Money laundering was not always controlled by a primary federal 
statute.  Prior to the statutes eventually codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 
1957, the federal government relied on a combination of Title 31 currency 
transaction reporting statutes, Title 21 conspiracy provisions, and Title 18 
conspiracy statutes to prosecute money laundering activities.16  The money 
laundering legislation developed from a combination of changes in 
conspiracy law and forfeiture law, as well as the challenges facing 
authorities in enforcing the currency transaction reporting requirements of 
the Bank Secrecy Act.17 
From a historical perspective, the money laundering statutes were also 
a response to the pressing social issues of the time.  Urbanization in the 
1980s and 1990s fueled drug trafficking.18  The huge profits generated by 
drug cartels and the increase of schemes to circumvent currency reporting 
laws led President Reagan to form the “President’s Commission on 
Organized Crime” through Executive Order 12,435.19  The purpose of the 
Commission was to investigate organized crime.20  Part of its 
responsibilities were to “evaluate Federal laws pertinent to the effort to 
combat organized crime,” and to make recommendations to improve law 
enforcement efforts.21  The Commission concluded that “money laundering 
is the lifeblood of organized crime”22 and “[w]ithout the means to launder 
money . . . organized crime could not flourish as it now does.”23  At the 
time, the primary means of detecting money launderers was through the 
Bank Secrecy Act, which imposes reporting requirements on financial 
 
 16.  Daniel L. Snedigar, Loose Change: The Seventh Circuit Misses an Opportunity to 
Clarify Money Laundering in United States v. Haddad, 2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 605, 607 
(2007). 
 17.  G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: The Crime of the ‘90’s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 149, 150 (1989). 
 18.  Daniel H. Cicchini, Note, From Urbanization to Globalization: Using the Federal 
Money Laundering and Civil Asset Forfeiture Statutes in the Twenty-First Century Drug 
War, 41 RUTGERS L.J.  741, 745 (2010). 
 19.  See Exec. Order No. 12,435, 48 Fed. Reg. 34,723 (Aug. 1, 1983) (establishing a 
commission to examine organized crime). 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Cover letter to PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH 
CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING, 
(1984), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf (last visited Nov. 
24, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/7TW2-PS8Y. 
 23.  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED 
CRIME, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING, 3 (1984), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/166517NCJRS.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2015), 
archived at https://perma.cc/7TW2-PS8Y. 
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institutions for transactions above a threshold amount.24  The Commission 
made a number of recommendations regarding amendments to the Bank 
Secrecy Act in order to tighten the restrictions on money launderers.25  
However, it recognized that these recommendations did not directly target 
money laundering activities.26  The Bank Secrecy Act only allowed law 
enforcement to penalize money launderers indirectly by punishing those 
who willfully violated the Act in the course of laundering their illicit 
funds.27  However, money launderers who complied with the recordkeeping 
and recording requirements of the Act, which they often did, could not be 
touched unless the government could show that they also violated another 
federal statute.28  Therefore, the Commission opined that the federal 
government must strike directly at the heart of the problem by 
criminalizing the use of financial institutions by money launderers.29  The 
Commission even prepared draft legislation in their report,30 and “[i]n 
response to the commission’s findings, Congress passed the Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986, . . . which was codified in 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1956, 1957.”31 
Two related reports from the Senate and House of Representatives 
provide valuable insight into the purpose of the money laundering statute.32  
The legislative history makes it clear that the statute was designed to create 
a new federal crime rather than to further penalize the underlying criminal 
conduct.33  However, not all aspects of the original proposal were 
incorporated into the final statute.  For example, the House Report 
suggested that the Money Laundering Control Act would penalize engaging 
in a financial transaction using criminally derived property, thereby 
encompassing virtually all activity involving illicit funds.34  However, in 
1988, then-Senator Joe Biden emphasized that the purpose of this 
amendment was to enhance the ability of law enforcement officers “to 
obtain evidence necessary to convict money launderers,”35 not just money 
spenders.  Thus, what had originally developed as a method to hinder 
 
 24.  Id. at 8. 
 25.  Id. at 59-61. 
 26.  Id. at 61. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Id. at 62. 
 30.  See id. at 65-82 (containing the draft legislation). 
 31.  Snedigar, supra note 16, at 607. 
 32.  See generally S. REP. NO. 99-433 (1986); H.R. REP. NO. 99-855 (1986) (discussing 
Congressional intent in the enactment of the money laundering statute). 
 33.  See S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 1-2; H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 7 (creating the new 
Federal crime of money laundering). 
 34.  H.R. REP. NO. 99-855, at 13. 
 35.  134 CONG. REC. S17, at 365 (1988) (emphasis added). 
ARTICLE 6 (WANG) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/7/16  3:02 PM 
2015] YES, THAT IS MONEY LAUNDERING 261 
 
organized crime became a targeted money laundering statute that is still in 
effect today. 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT PRE-CUELLAR 
An individual can put money in another’s name in a number of ways 
including depositing money into a bank account that bears someone else’s 
name, conducting transactions in another person’s name, or buying 
property and placing the title in the name of someone other than the buyer.  
All of the circuits agree that putting money or assets into a third party’s 
name is indicative of money laundering.  What differs among the circuits is 
whether that act alone is sufficient to convict a defendant of concealment 
money laundering or if they need to consider additional facts before 
conviction. 
A number of circuits have found that simply putting unlawful 
proceeds into a third party’s name is sufficient indication of intent to 
conceal.  In United States v. Wilkinson, the defendants transferred 
fraudulently obtained funds to their other businesses, causing the primary 
business to record the transfers on its books using false names for the 
companies.36  This transaction could be characterized as an attempt to 
conceal ownership.  The Fourth Circuit held that doctoring the books with 
the false names and submitting reports to another company using those 
names was sufficient to sustain the money laundering charge.37 
Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit seems to require more than the simple 
transfer of unlawful assets into another person’s name in order to sustain a 
concealment money laundering conviction.  For example, transferring 
money from one account in an individual’s name to another account in the 
same individual’s name is insufficient to support an inference that the 
particular transaction was intended to conceal.38  This contrast with the 
Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Wilkinson is not that surprising since 
transferring money into an account in one’s own name does not conceal 
ownership.  Still, the Fifth Circuit acknowledges that the use of third 
persons is usually sufficient to demonstrate intent to conceal.39  For 
example, it found intent to conceal in United States v. Powers, in which it 
held that depositing checks into a third-party corporation’s bank account 
 
 36.  United States v. Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 214, 222-23 (4th Cir. 1998). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1388 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
evidence was insufficient to find that debtor committed offense of money laundering with 
respect to check issued to debtor’s girlfriend from her brokerage account and deposited by 
her into one of her personal checking accounts). 
 39.  United States v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997).   
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was sufficient to demonstrate intent to conceal.40 
The Tenth Circuit provided the following list of some of the types of 
conduct that can support a jury finding a defendant engaged in transactional 
money laundering: 
[S]tatements by a defendant probative of intent to conceal; 
unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; structuring the 
transaction in a way to avoid attention; depositing illegal profits 
in the bank account of a legitimate business; highly irregular 
features of the transaction; using third parties to conceal the real 
owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the 
transaction; or expert testimony on practices of criminals.41 
However, while these activities may support a conclusion of guilt, they are 
not necessarily sufficient to convict a defendant on their own.  Many 
money laundering cases require factual analysis and judges decide them on 
a case-by-case basis.  The differing facts among cases are perhaps the main 
reason that the circuits have struggled to agree on a single standard. 
A. Circuits Agree That the Money Laundering Statute Is Not a 
Spending Statute 
One area where the courts have agreed is the purpose of the statute.  
The money laundering statute is a statute meant to punish money 
laundering and nothing more.  While the statute is admittedly broad, there 
is widespread agreement among the circuits that it does not criminalize the 
mere act of spending illicit proceeds.42 
The Sixth Circuit in particular has emphasized that the money 
laundering statute is not a spending statute.  The buying of personal goods 
with unlawful proceeds alone does not show intent to conceal.  For 
example, in United States v. Marshall, the defendant stole money from an 
ATM, which he then used to purchase a Rolex watch, a diamond tennis 
bracelet, and wine.43  The court found that the government could not infer 
intent to disguise the money in violation of section 1956.44  It stated that 
“Congress did not intend for this law to be treated as a ‘money spending 
 
 40.  United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 754 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 41.  United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
 42.  See Matthew R. Auten, Note and Comment, Money Spending or Money 
Laundering: The Fine Line Between Legal and Illegal Financial Transactions, 33 PACE L. 
REV. 1231, 1232 (2013) (exploring courts’ approaches to differentiating money laundering 
from money spending). 
 43.  United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
925 (2001). 
 44.  Id. at 539-40. 
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statute,’” and “the government must produce more evidence than the 
simple fact of a retail purchase using illegally obtained money in order to 
prove the ‘intent to disguise’ element of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).”45  Therefore, 
showing that a defendant spent illicit funds is not a feasible path for 
prosecutors in money laundering cases. 
B. Factors in Determining Intent to Conceal 
While money laundering cases tend to be particularly fact-specific, 
there are certain types of transactions that courts consistently believe imply 
an intention to conceal.  These include unusual financial transactions and 
transactions indicating a subjective intent to conceal by the defendant.  
Conversely, some circuits are hesitant to find intent in cases where there is 
a dearth of evidence in the record indicating that a defendant’s actions were 
designed to conceal.  For example, courts will typically infer that open and 
conspicuous transactions indicate that defendants were not trying to 
conceal the funds as much they were merely spending their illegally 
obtained funds. 
1. Unusual Financial Transactions 
A highly unusual financial transaction can support a reasonable 
inference of design to conceal.46  The Eleventh Circuit set out several 
factors that are helpful in determining whether a transaction was designed 
to conceal including, among others, statements by a defendant probative of 
intent to conceal, unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction, highly 
irregular features of the transaction, and a series of unusual financial moves 
cumulating in the transaction.47  In United States v. Magluta, a drug dealer 
paid his attorney fees with a check from an Israeli bank account under a 
fictitious name.48  His associates transferred cash between themselves, then 
transported the money from Miami to New York, and ultimately moved the 
 
 45.  Id. at 538. 
 46.  See United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1387 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding enough 
evidence in a transaction where defendant’s girlfriend deposited a check issued by the trust 
into a personal checking account in her name, thereby allowing defendant to get the money 
out of his girlfriend’s brokerage account without creating any record of his involvement in 
the transaction).  See also United States v. Clements, 73 F.3d 1330, 1340 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(defendant repeatedly converted received funds into multiple cashier’s checks made out to 
himself, which he then deposited into his wife’s separate bank account thereby “obscur[ing] 
the link between the money and . . . himself” and “undeniably made it more difficult for the 
IRS to detect his evasion”). 
 47.  United States v. Majors, 196 F.3d 1206, 1213 n.18 (11th Cir. 1999) 
 48.  United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1175 (11th Cir. 2005) 
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funds to the Israeli bank from which the defendant wrote the check to pay 
his attorney.49  The use of so many intermediate steps implied a design to 
conceal the source of the funds.50  The court found that the cash transfers, 
the movement of the cash from Miami to New York to Israel, and the use 
of a foreign account held in a false name were “a series of unusual financial 
moves” which culminated in the defendant writing the checks.51  Therefore, 
there was an air of “unusual secrecy surround[ing] the transaction[s]” and 
the defendant’s use of his associates and the fictitious name demonstrated 
his use of “third parties to conceal the real owner” of the money in the 
foreign account.52  The final transaction with the defendant writing checks 
on a foreign account held in a false name was itself also “highly 
irregular.”53  The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the defendant’s 
convictions on the substantive money laundering counts since he used such 
an elaborate plan to conceal the fact that he was using drug proceeds to pay 
his attorneys.54 
The fact that unusual financial transactions can be used as evidence of 
concealment laundering is consistent with the idea that courts care about 
the subjective intent of the money launderer.  Using complicated financial 
transactions to disguise money shows that a defendant took affirmative 
steps to make it harder to trace the funds, which provides an even stronger 
indication of a purpose to conceal. 
2. Open and Conspicuous Transactions 
Courts have typically found that situations where defendants used the 
products that they purchased with their unlawful proceeds in an open and 
conspicuous manner do not satisfy the “intent to conceal” element.  The 
rationale behind these decisions appears to be a practical one in that if a 
defendant flaunted his or her ill-gotten gains in such an obvious manner, 
then he or she must not have had an intent to conceal them.  Of course, this 
is all moot if there is evidence in the record of a clear intent to conceal 
despite using their purchases openly and obviously.  This also goes back to 
the point that section 1956 is not a money spending statute:  without an 
intent or design to conceal, a defendant is only guilty of purchasing goods 
with illicit funds, which is not chargeable under this statute. 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See id. at 1177 (“Magluta went to great pains to conceal the fact that he was using 
drug proceeds to pay his lawyers.”). 
 51.  Id. at 1176-77 (quoting Majors, 196 F.3d at 1213). 
 52.  Id. (quoting Majors, 196 F.3d at 1213). 
 53.  Id. (quoting Majors, 196 F.3d at 1213). 
 54.  Id. at 1177. 
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The Tenth Circuit held in United States v. Sanders that the defendant’s 
purchase of a car with the title in his daughter’s name was insufficient to 
support his money laundering convictions.55  The government contended 
that this transaction was designed to conceal or disguise proceeds from the 
sale of drugs, thereby concealing the source of the funds.56  Factors that the 
court considered included the fact that the daughter was present in the car 
lot at the time of the purchase, the daughter shared the defendant’s last 
name, and the defendant and his wife used the car conspicuously.57  The 
court believed that all of these factors “undermine[d] the government’s 
argument . . . that the . . . purchase involved the requisite design of 
concealment.”58  The Tenth Circuit maintained this position in United 
States v. Lovett.59  In that case, the purchase of a car and ring with 
unlawfully obtained funds from the defendant’s grandmother’s bank 
accounts was insufficient to support the money laundering charges.60  
When the defendant purchased the car, he made statements to the car dealer 
about “how he had done really well in the siding business.”61  The court 
said that there was no indication that the defendant made statements in an 
effort to justify or explain his ability to purchase the car with cash.62  The 
statements were insufficient evidence to show an intent to conceal and in 
the absence of any evidence of concealment, the “defendant’s open and 
conspicuous manner of purchasing the [vehicle] undermines any inference 
of concealment or disguise.”63  The court applied the same reasoning to the 
purchase of the ring, finding that the inference of concealment from the 
unusual manner of payment was usurped by the defendant’s open and 
conspicuous purchase,64 thereby solidifying the point that purchasing items 
alone cannot sustain a money laundering conviction since it is not a money 
spending statute. 
However, this defendant-friendly assumption may be negated by 
concrete evidence of intent to conceal.  For example, United States v. 
Garcia-Emanuel involved the purchase of a pickup truck and a horse trailer 
in the defendant’s wife’s name, among other goods.65  Despite finding that 
the purchase of certain horses, a different horse trailer, a covered riding 
 
 55.  United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 56.  Id. at 945-46. 
 57.  Id. at 946. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1036-37 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 1036. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. at 1037. 
 65.  United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1478 (10th Cir. 1994). 
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area, and round pen were insufficient to demonstrate a design to conceal, 
the Tenth Circuit in the same opinion deemed this particular transaction as 
probative of an intent to conceal because a witness testified that the 
defendant put those assets in his wife’s name in order to deceive the IRS.66  
Of course, the reliability of the witness may come into question.  Still, 
Garcia-Emanuel recognized that the purchase of goods in a third party’s 
name alone was insufficient to convict someone for concealment money 
laundering in the Tenth Circuit without more reliable evidence of intent.  
Without this design to conceal, the government would have nothing 
because, once again, section 1956 is not a money spending statute. 
The Fifth Circuit had a similar holding in United States v. Dobbs.67  In 
Dobbs, the defendant was a cattle rancher who had been charged with 
money laundering for depositing illegal cattle sale proceeds in his wife’s 
bank account used to pay ordinary household and ranch expenses.68  The 
court found that this typical and straightforward banking transaction failed 
to demonstrate intent to conceal the origin of the money.69  Transactions 
that were “open and notorious” and involved no third parties to make 
purchases or hide defendant’s activity did not constitute money 
laundering.70 
3. Subjective Intent of the Money Launderer 
Some circuits looked at the knowledge and intent of the money 
launderer, as opposed to objectively looking at the defendants’ acts, and 
therefore seemed to already be following the line of reasoning later 
solidified by Cuellar. 
The Eighth Circuit has focused on the defendant’s knowledge that 
transferring the funds to a third party would result in concealing the money 
or making it more difficult to trace.  For example, in United States v. 
Norman, the defendant bought a Range Rover in his business’s name.71  
The defendant contended that he could not be found guilty of money 
laundering because he used his own name and made no effort to conceal his 
identity in the transaction that was the basis for the money laundering 
charges.72  The court rejected these claims and asserted that the point was 
not whether the car seller was deceived as to who the defendant was but 
 
 66.  Id. at 1478. 
 67.  United States v. Dobbs, 63 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 68.  Id. at 397-98. 
 69.  Id. at 397. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 72.  Id. at 376. 
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rather that by changing the proceeds of an unlawful activity from a bank 
account into the form of an automobile, the defendant “made it more 
difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to 
it.”73  Thus, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a money laundering conviction in a 
case where everything was in the defendant’s name yet there was still 
inferable intent to conceal.  It has made clear that “[i]t is the transformation 
of unlawfully gained cash into another form . . . that evinces the design to 
conceal.”74  For example, the use of drug proceeds to purchase stock in the 
name of a third party would meet the concealing test.75  This reasoning has 
its issues.  The “transformation of unlawfully gained cash into another 
form” seems like another way of saying buying things with illicit proceeds.  
However, both case law and the statute’s legislative history have 
emphasized that the money laundering statute is not a money spending 
statute.  Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit did not address this issue in its 
reasoning. 
In United States v. Heaps, the defendant was a drug dealer who 
instructed that payment be wire transferred to his wife.76  The wife testified 
at trial that she picked up the money at the direction of the defendant, 
cashed the money orders, and brought the money to the apartment that she 
shared with the defendant where she then put the cash in a money box.77  
The government argued that the defendant instructed the money be 
transferred to his wife rather than to himself in order to conceal and 
disguise the source and ownership of the funds from law enforcement 
authorities.78  The only witness who testified to the purpose of the 
arrangement was the wife, who asserted that the only reason that she picked 
up the money was because the defendant was away and would not be able 
to go himself.79  The defense also pointed to a taped conversation in 
evidence in which the defendant told his co-conspirators that they did not 
need to send the money to his wife again.80  The defense argued that since 
the defendant was available at the time of the second wiring, there was no 
reason to have the money sent to his wife.81  The Fourth Circuit was 
convinced by this reasoning and held that the fact that the money was wired 
 
 73.  Id. at 377. 
 74.  United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 75.  United States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 76.  United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 481 (4th Cir. 1994).  At the time of the 
transactions, the woman was the defendant’s girlfriend, but at the time of trial, she was his 
wife. 
 77.  Id. at 482. 
 78.  Id. at 487. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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to the defendant’s wife instead of to the defendant was not enough to show 
concealment because the record showed that it was for the purpose of 
convenience and not concealment.82  This interpretation may be a bit 
generous, but it demonstrates how courts are concerned about the intent to 
conceal and not just activities that may have an effect of concealing.  This 
type of reasoning is reminiscent of what the Supreme Court later held in 
Cuellar, which indicates that focusing on an alleged money launderer’s 
subjective purpose is not a novel notion. 
C. Specific Examples of Acts Transferring to Third Party 
Multiple circuits agree that employing a third party to conceal the 
defendant’s identity is one of the most obvious kinds of evidence that 
would sustain intent to conceal.83  Two specific ways that this is 
accomplished is by placing funds in a relative’s name or by purchasing cars 
and writing someone else’s name in the car titles. 
1. Placing Funds In A Relative’s Name 
Incidents where an individual places illegally obtained funds or assets 
in a relative’s name may be probative of intent to conceal due to the close 
relationship that the defendant shares with the third party.  By placing illicit 
proceeds in a relative’s possession, the defendant could still theoretically 
regain access at a later date relatively easily.  In contrast, if a defendant 
puts money into a bank account in a person’s name with whom he or she 
has no legal relationship, the chances of those funds making their way back 
to the defendant would appear to diminish because that third party would 
need to grant the defendant access. 
The First, Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have found depositing 
unlawful proceeds in a relative’s name probative of intent to conceal or 
disguise.  In United States v. Hall, the defendant gave his sister $16,000 in 
cash in order to purchase a money order in her name payable to a truck 
dealer.84  The defendant then used the money order to purchase a dump 
truck.85  The First Circuit reasoned that the defendant’s use of his sister’s 
 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  United States v. Marshall, 248 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 
925 (2001).  See also United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1034 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(asserting the same proposition); United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1124-25 (6th Cir. 
1996) (asserting the same proposition in a case where defendant caused third parties to wire 
transfer drug proceeds to members of his family for his benefit, without defendant’s name 
appearing on any records, thus concealing defendant’s ownership of the funds). 
 84.  United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 85.  Id. 
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name on the money order evidenced intent to conceal because it was an 
“attempt[] to disguise the source of the proceeds by having it pass through 
another person’s control.”86 
The Second Circuit has taken a more literal approach to the text of the 
statute and has still found that the use of a third party is a sufficient 
indication of concealment money laundering:  “[Section] 1956 (a)(1)(B)(i) 
does not require an attempt to conceal the identity of the defendant; a 
scheme that conceals only the source of the funds falls within the purview 
of the statute.”87  Nonetheless, the court held that the concealment element 
was satisfied in United States v. Stephenson, where the defendant’s wife 
put the defendant’s illegal drug proceeds into a safe deposit box in her 
name.88  The Second Circuit has also noted that transferring proceeds to an 
account solely held by the defendant’s wife would be a circumstance that 
might support an inference of deliberate concealment.89 
The Fifth Circuit has reasoned that using a third party like a relative to 
purchase goods on one’s behalf or from which one will benefit would 
usually constitute adequate proof of a design to conceal.90  In United States 
v. Short, the Fifth Circuit found sufficient evidence to satisfy the 
concealment element when the defendant’s wife placed illegally obtained 
money in a safe deposit box under another relative’s name.91  The Eighth 
Circuit came to similar conclusions in United States v. Bowman.92  In 
Bowman, the defendant deposited criminally derived funds into his 
girlfriend’s account that she later used to buy personal items.93  The 
defendant argued that he was simply financing his girlfriend’s checking 
account but the court found that this type of behavior “evinces the design to 
conceal.”94 
The Tenth Circuit had not specifically addressed how the concealment 
element applied when a defendant deposits unlawful proceeds into a family 
member’s account prior to United States v. Shepard, in which the defendant 
deposited checks that were made out to a third party and endorsed by the 
third party and the defendant into his daughter’s bank account.95  The court 
heavily considered other circuits’ approaches when conducting its analysis: 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  United States v. Kinzler, 55 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 88.  United States v. Stephenson, 183 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 1999).   
 89.  United States v. Davidson, 175 F. App’x 399, 401 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 90.  United States v. Willey, 57 F.3d 1374, 1385 (5th Cir. 1995) (describing the Tenth 
Circuit’s analysis in United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 91.  United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 92.  United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  United States v. Shepard, 396 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005). 
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[I]n light of Garcia-Emanuel, other circuits’ treatment of illegal 
deposits into a relative’s account, and our standard of review of a 
jury verdict, we find sufficient evidence of concealment to 
support Mr. Shepard’s conviction . . . . A rational jury could 
reasonably conclude that Mr. Shepard intended to conceal or 
disguise the unlawfully gained checks when he deposited them in 
his daughter’s account.96 
In United States v. Lovett, the Tenth Circuit also found that the 
evidence was sufficient to support money laundering counts related to the 
defendant’s purchase of a pickup truck for his brother and the purchase of a 
house for himself and his wife.97  These goods were purchased with funds 
that the defendant unlawfully withdrew from his grandmother’s account.98  
The brother testified that the defendant specifically instructed him to not 
tell their grandmother about the purchase of the pickup truck.99  The court 
found that the purchase of the truck was designed to conceal the illegal 
source of the proceeds from individuals who would likely expose the 
defendant’s underlying fraudulent activities.100  By purchasing the truck, 
the defendant “both disguised the nature of the [funds] . . . and also 
prevented discovery of the fraudulent activities that generated the funds 
ultimately used to purchase the [truck].”101  Therefore, the use of a 
relative’s name has been accepted by multiple circuits as sufficient 
evidence to prove a design to conceal. 
2. Car Titling 
Placing car titles in another’s name is an additional means that money 
launderers have used to conceal unlawful proceeds.  In United States v. 
Antzoulatos, a car dealer sold numerous cars to alleged drug dealers, titling 
them in other real and fictitious names or in the name of the car 
dealership.102  One car was titled in the name of a customer’s one-year-old 
nephew.103  The Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[t]he mistitling of cars is 
relevant in this case only because of the number of incidents involved and 
only then when viewed in conjunction with the other facts of this case.  
There is certainly nothing illegal about buying a car and placing that car in 
 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1033-36 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 98.  Id. at 1031-32. 
 99.  Id. at 1033. 
 100.  Id. at 1034. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d 720, 721-22 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 103.  Id. at 722. 
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someone else’s name. . . .”104  Thus, although nominee titling, like 
transferring money to a third party, is not illegal per se, in most cases it will 
be taken as circumstantial evidence of concealment.105  In United States v. 
Barnett, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the money laundering conviction of 
an attorney who advised his client to title cars in the attorney’s name and 
the client’s brother’s name.106  The Fourth Circuit also found intent to 
conceal in an analogous case.  In United States v. Adra, the defendant was 
the manager of an automobile leasing business where he developed a 
financing program catered toward high-credit-risk lessee clientele.107  The 
transactions that led to the indictments in this case each involved a similar 
fact pattern in which a young man came into the leasing company with an 
older woman to apply for an automobile lease.108  In each case, the 
defendant would direct the female companion to fill out the lease 
application with her own income and credit information as the “nominee” 
of the lease.109  However, the woman would not make any of the payments 
nor be given possession of the car.110  Instead, the actual lessee would make 
the payments and possess the car.111  It later came out that the actual lessee 
in each of these transactions was engaged in drug trafficking.112  Thus, in 
this specific situation, titling the car in another person’s name was a clear 
indication of concealment. 
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a similar view about putting a car title 
in the name of someone other than the buyer.  In United States v. Garcia-
Jaimes, there was evidence that one of the defendants had instructed that a 
car be put in his wife’s name in the course of a scheme involving the 
transportation of illegal proceeds.113  The court found that the plan allowed 
the owner of the money to place it in the hands of a third party, which 
makes it difficult to determine both the owner and source of the money, 
and concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that 
the defendants had engaged in concealment money laundering.114  
Therefore, putting a car title in another’s name is also accepted as a general 
 
 104.  Id. at 727 n.4. 
 105.  Ratliff, supra note 14, at 178. 
 106.  United States v. Barnett, No. 91-3758, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 28555, at *1 (7th 
Cir. Aug. 18, 1993). 
 107.  United States v. Adra, No. 93-5797, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 35200, at *1 (4th Cir. 
Dec. 13, 1994). 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007), overruled by 
Moreno-Gonzalez v. United States, 533 U.S. 1091 (2008) (mem.). 
 114.  Id. 
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indication of concealment so long as there are also additional facts present 
that support this conclusion. 
III. REGALADO CUELLAR V. UNITED STATES 
The analysis in concealment money laundering changed in 2008 with 
the decision in Cuellar v. United States.  While some circuits had already 
been focusing on whether the intent of the defendant was to conceal, other 
circuits had been taking an objective approach and evaluating whether a 
defendant’s actions made it more likely that funds could not be traced.  
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cuellar, the standard has been set to 
assess the subjective intent of the alleged money launderer. 
In Cuellar, the defendant was stopped by a trooper while he was 
driving in Texas to the Mexico border.115  Upon further inspection, the 
trooper found a secret compartment under the car’s rear floorboard and 
inside was $81,000 in cash wrapped in plastic bags.116  This case involved 
the provision of the money laundering statute that prohibits international 
transportation of the proceeds of unlawful activity.117  Cuellar was 
convicted in the district court but his conviction was reversed at the Fifth 
Circuit.118  The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision and 
noted that “[b]ecause the Fifth Circuit used ‘design’ to refer not to the 
purpose of the transportation but to the manner in which it was carried out, 
its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning 
of ‘design’ as structure or arrangement.”119  In other words, how one moves 
the money is distinct from why one moves the money.120  The Supreme 
Court found that the secretive aspects of the transportation were employed 
to facilitate the transportation, but not necessarily that secrecy was the 
purpose of the transportation.121  By construing the facts in this way, the 
Supreme Court equated the “design” element of section 1956 with purpose.  
In order to convict the defendant, the government had to demonstrate that 
he did more than merely hide the money during its transport.122  The 
holding in Cuellar meant that “the inevitable effort to conceal every crime 
from law enforcement d[id] not transform every financial transaction or 
transportation involving criminally derived funds into money 
 
 115.  Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 553 (2008). 
 116.  Id. at 554. 
 117.  Id. at 553. 
 118.  Id. at 554-55. 
 119.  Id. at 564. 
 120.  Id. at 566. 
 121.  Id. at 567. 
 122.  Id. at 553. 
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laundering.”123 
In their concurrence, Justices Alito and Kennedy argued that intent to 
conceal can be inferred.124  They contended that the government could have 
shown inferred intent if it had introduced evidence showing that (1) taking 
money across the border had one of the effects of concealing the nature, 
location, source, ownership, or control of funds and (2) it was commonly 
known in the relevant circles that taking money across the border would 
have one of these effects.125  This would have helped the inference that the 
scheme was designed to conceal and the person carrying out the scheme 
knew that this was the design.  Here, while the government did introduce 
evidence about the effects of carrying money across the border, it did not 
point to any evidence in the record that would allow the fact finder to infer 
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.126  Cuellar resolved a circuit split 
by rejecting the requirement of an “attempt to create the appearance of 
legitimate wealth” for money laundering.127  The question that remained 
post-Cuellar was whether the “design to conceal” requirement had teeth.128 
IV. POST-CUELLAR 
In light of its decision in Cuellar, the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded four cases on the same day.129  After, circuit courts have 
generally followed the Supreme Court’s orders to focus on the why instead 
of the how.  The courts have required that the government prove more than 
showing that a transaction had a concealing effect or that the transaction 
was structured to conceal the nature of illicit funds.130  Instead, 
“[c]oncealment – even deliberate concealment – as mere facilitation of 
some other purpose, is not enough to convict.  What is required, rather, is 
 
 123.  Barry Boss et al., Money Laundering Defense After Santos and Regalado Cuellar, 
CHAMPION, Sept. 2008, at 12, 12. 
 124.  Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 569 (2008). 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 570. 
 127.  Samuel P. Schnider, The “Design to Conceal” Requirement and the Elusive 
Culprits of Money-Laundering, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 2, 2 (2012). 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  The Supreme Court vacated Moreno-Gonzalez v. United States, 128 U.S. 2901 
(2008) (mem.), rev’d 313 F. App’x 215 (11th Cir. 2008); Balderas v. United States, 128 
U.S. 2901 (2008) (mem.), rev’d 237 F. App’x 921 (5th Cir. 2007); Nunez-Virraizabal v. 
United States, 128 U.S. 2901 (2008) (mem.), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 
484 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2007); Ness v. United States, 128 U.S. 2900 (2008) (mem.), rev’d 
466 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006).  
 130.  See, e.g., United States v. Faulkenberry, 614 F.3d 573, 586 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that concealment must be the purpose of the transaction). 
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that concealment be an animating purpose of the transaction.”131 
A. Application of Concealment Standard After Cuellar 
Cuellar does not appear to have resolved the varied liberality with 
which the different circuits construed the standard for concealment money 
laundering under section 1956.  Courts often still rely on the traditional 
indicators of money laundering.  For example, in one case the Fifth Circuit 
opined: 
Here, the government relied on [the defendant]’s transfers of 
funds from his operating accounts to investment accounts, and on 
[defendant]’s purchases of property and investments – all done 
openly, in his name – as proof of concealment money laundering. 
. . . [Defendant] did not use false names, third parties, or any 
particularly complicated financial maneuvers, which are usual 
hallmarks of an intent to conceal. . . . We thus find that there is 
insufficient evidence of concealment money laundering . . . .132 
There have also been instances where it appears that the Cuellar 
standard was not properly applied.  For example, in United States v. Carter, 
the defendant’s husband had underreported taxes, and the defendant had 
signed those joint tax returns.133  During the course of their divorce 
proceedings, the defendant acted under the advice of her lawyer and moved 
$3,900,000 into previously existing accounts under only her name.134  As a 
result of these actions, the defendant was later convicted of twenty-two 
counts of money laundering, eighteen of which were under section 1956.135  
During sentencing, the district court explained: 
I believe that at some point [defendant] must have known her 
husband was stealing money because their spending went from 
one level to an entirely different level. . . . There is no indication 
that she had anything to do with the fraud.  It does, however, 
seem to me that she must have been aware at some point that her 
husband was doing something illegal because of the vast amount 
of money that all of a sudden came into his hands . . . .136 
This reasoning seems to indicate that the court believed the defendant 
knew that the source of these funds was illegal, not that her actions were 
designed to conceal the money from authorities rather than just her 
 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 690 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 133.  United States v. Carter, 538 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 787. 
 136.  Id. at 788-89. 
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husband.  Granted, Carter was decided only a couple of months after 
Cuellar, but that does not change the fact that its holding appears to be 
inconsistent. 
Other circuits have remained more loyal to the Supreme Court’s 
directive in Cuellar.  The First Circuit applied Cuellar in its decision in 
United States v. Cedeno-Perez.137  Here, the defendant was charged with 
conspiracy to commit money laundering after delivering more than 
$200,000 to an undercover agent posing as a money launderer.138  The court 
distinguished this case from Cuellar because here, instead of transportation, 
the underlying criminal conduct was a financial transaction.139  The 
defendant engaged in conduct that was commonly known to conceal such 
as employing code words, establishing meeting locations where there 
would be no police, hiding bags of packaged money in his car, and making 
deliveries in mall parking lots.140  The court felt that these actions had the 
effects of hiding the money and rendering the transaction relatively 
suspicious, which could lead a rational jury to have “reasoned that, since it 
is commonly known that engaging in such conduct would have the effect of 
concealing the location, source, ownership or control of the money being 
transferred, it was [the defendant]’s purpose in so acting to conceal those 
traits of the proceeds.”141  This analysis seems to coincide with Justices 
Alito and Kennedy’s suggestion in their Cuellar concurrence opinion. 
The Second Circuit distinguished United States v. Mercedes from 
Cuellar by pointing out that the purpose of the attempted money 
transaction in this case was to conceal the source of narcotics proceeds 
rather than transporting cash.142  Nonetheless, the court still cited and 
applied the rule established in Cuellar in affirming the defendant’s money 
laundering convictions.  During the plea colloquy in the district court, the 
defendant was specifically asked, “[w]as the purpose to hide the fact that 
[the money] was from narcotics?” to which the defendant replied, “I 
believe so.”143  Based on Cuellar, the court found that this statement 
substantiated that the purpose of the transaction was to conceal the source 
of the narcotics proceeds and provided sufficient evidence that the 
transaction violated the concealment clause of the money laundering 
statute.144  Of course, not all defendants make it that easy for the court by 
admitting a concealment purpose for their actions.  While Cuellar has 
 
 137.  United States v. Cedeno-Perez, 579 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 138.  Id. at 55. 
 139.  Id. at 61. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  United States v. Mercedes, 283 F. App’x 862, 864 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
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changed the focus of courts, it has not prevented them from making 
inferences as to defendants’ ultimate purposes or intents. 
1. Intent to Conceal Can Be Inferred from Circumstantial Evidence 
In the absence of an explicit admission of intent to conceal, courts 
have still affirmed concealment money laundering convictions on the basis 
of circumstantial evidence.145  In fact, according to the Fourth Circuit, 
Cuellar made clear that a jury may infer the requisite design to conceal 
based on circumstantial evidence.146 
The Eighth Circuit has followed this approach.  In United States v. 
Delgado, the defendant gave his wife’s brother, Santa-Anna, cashier’s 
checks and money orders to pay off the mortgage Santa-Anna owed on a 
residence.147  The government also produced evidence that the brother had 
signed over the residence to a company the defendant’s wife had formed 
three days earlier.148  The court found that this supported an inference that 
the defendant designed the transaction to disguise the illegal source and 
nature of the funds that he used to finance the property transfer, which 
sustained his money laundering conviction.149  Therefore, the standard that 
has developed is whether a reasonable trier of fact could determine that a 
defendant acted with the purpose of concealing rather than concealment 
being a collateral consequence of the transaction.150 
In United States v. Slagg, the Eighth Circuit concluded that there was 
“ample circumstantial evidence” to allow a reasonable jury to infer that at 
least some of the money gathered for the defendant’s $50,000 bail was drug 
proceeds and the defendant was therefore guilty of conspiring to violate the 
money laundering statute.151  In that case, the government presented 
evidence of telephone conversations that the defendant had with his mother 
and an unidentified man regarding his bail money.152  In those recordings, 
the unidentified man described bringing the money to the courthouse as 
 
 145.  See, e.g., United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 483 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“A conviction requires evidence of intent to disguise or conceal the transaction, whether 
from direct evidence, like the defendant’s own statements, or from circumstantial evidence, 
like the use of a third party to disguise the true owner, or unusual secrecy.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 146.  United States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 724 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 147.  United States v. Delgado, 653 F.3d 729, 738 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  See, e.g., United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 547 (9th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
defendant’s money laundering conviction because a reasonable finder of fact could 
determine that defendant acted with an intent to conceal). 
 151.  United States v. Slagg, 651 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 152.  Id. at 838. 
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“the one thing” impeding them from bailing the defendant out of jail and 
that using the money as bail would “risk it ‘disappear[ing].’”153  The 
defendant’s mother ultimately retained two bail bondsmen to deliver the 
bail money to the courthouse.154  On appeal, the defendant argued that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew that the bail-posting 
transaction was “designed in whole or in part . . . to conceal or disguise” a 
statutorily listed attribute of the money.155  The court applied Cuellar and 
found that had the sole purpose of the agreement been to bail the defendant 
out of jail, the transaction would not violate the money laundering statute 
since it is not a “money spending statute.”156  However, from these 
conversations, a jury could reasonably infer that the defendant knew his 
colleagues planned to conduct the transaction in such a way as to “‘conceal 
or disguise the nature, . . . the source, the ownership or the control’” of the 
money and reduce the risk of the money’s “‘disappearing’” – in other 
words, later being seized as drug proceeds.157 
The Third Circuit used the same reasoning in United States v. 
Young.158  In Young, a man named Myron Punter was a crack cocaine 
dealer in Alaska who became concerned that he was casting suspicion upon 
himself by sending a high volume of wire transfers and money orders in his 
own name.159  The defendant was a childhood friend of Isiah Fawkes, who 
was Punter’s cocaine source in the Virgin Islands.  Fawkes instructed 
Punter to send the money to the defendant and other individuals who would 
then turn the money over to him.160  At trial, the jury heard evidence that 
Fawkes provided Punter with names of individuals in the Virgin Islands to 
whom the drug payments should be sent, including the defendant, in order 
to “lessen suspicion.”161  The court concluded that the evidence was 
sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that the defendant knew that 
the money wire transactions in question were designed to conceal the true 
“nature, location, source, ownership, or control” of the funds and affirmed 
his money laundering conviction.162 
It seems that so long as a reasonable jury could find or infer that a 
defendant acted with the design to conceal the nature, location, source, 
 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 845 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i)). 
 156.  Id. (quoting United States v. Shoff, 151 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
 157.  Id. at 846 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)). 
 158.  United States v. Young, 532 F. App’x 259 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 159.  Id. at 260. 
 160.  Id. at 260-61. 
 161.  Id. at 263. 
 162.  Id. at 263-64 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333, 338 (3d Cir. 
2011)). 
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ownership, or control of funds in the course of a financial transaction, those 
cases would not contradict Cuellar, and the money laundering conviction 
would stand.  However, while this threshold does not seem like an 
unbearably tough one to surpass, there are still a number of cases post-
Cuellar where the government has not been able to meet this burden. 
2. Cases that Failed the Cuellar Test 
In United States v. Law, the defendants had been under investigation 
by the FBI for drug trafficking.163  The government argued at trial that the 
defendants conspired to launder the proceeds of their narcotics activities by 
using those proceeds to pay a mortgage.164  However, the mortgage 
payments provided the defendants with legitimate benefits, such as rental 
income and a base for the drug operation.165  The D.C. Circuit found that 
the defendants’ explanations for the mortgage payments created sufficient 
reasonable doubt and no jury could conclude that that the purpose in paying 
the mortgage was to conceal the source of illegally obtained funds.166  In 
other words, a reasonable jury could not conclude that the “why” of 
defendants’ actions was for the purpose of concealing. 
The Third Circuit came to a similar conclusion in United States v. 
Richardson.167  In Richardson, the defendant’s boyfriend was a drug dealer, 
and she lied on a mortgage application regarding her income so that her 
boyfriend’s name would not need to be included.168  The court found that 
this did not satisfy the elements needed for concealment money laundering 
because the defendant was not trying to hide the boyfriend’s involvement 
but was simply trying to get a loan without his bad credit impacting it.169  
Regardless of whether the case was decided correctly, Richardson 
demonstrates how although a court or jury could imagine a scenario where 
the defendant acted with the purpose of concealing, defendants can also 
rebut this conclusion by giving a plausible alternative explanation for their 
actions.  Since the “why” of an action is so subjective, as long as the 
justification that a defendant presents for why they did what they did is 
reasonable, a court is likely to side with the defendant after Cuellar. 
3. Examples of Cases that Were Reversed or Would Be Reversed 
 
 163.  United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 164.  Id. at 895. 
 165.  Id. at 897. 
 166.  Id. at 896. 
 167.  United States v. Richardson, 658 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 168.  Id. at 336. 
 169.  Id. at 342. 
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After Cuellar 
Cuellar was a major decision that had significant ramifications in 
money laundering case law.  A few decisions that were either reversed by 
Cuellar or would be decided differently had the Cuellar standard been in 
effect are discussed below. 
United States v. Ness is one of the cases that the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded in light of its decision in Cuellar.170  The defendant 
in Ness had been convicted of one count of conspiring to commit money 
laundering and one substantive money laundering count.171  The facts in 
Ness were very similar to the situation in Cuellar.  The defendant ran an 
armored car carrier business that he used to receive millions of dollars in 
narcotics proceeds from drug traffickers and then transport the money 
abroad.172  The defendant avoided leaving a paper trail, hid the proceeds in 
packages of jewelry, and used code words during his operation.173  The 
Second Circuit reasoned that this evidence only showed “how” he moved 
the money, but not “why.”174  Under Cuellar, such evidence was 
insufficient to convict the defendant of concealment money laundering 
because it only demonstrated an intent to conceal the transportation and not 
that the transportation was designed to conceal.175  Therefore, as a result of 
Cuellar, the Second Circuit overturned the convictions. 
In Garcia-Jaimes, which was previously discussed in Part II, the 
defendant put a car in his wife’s name that the court interpreted as an 
attempt to make his illegal proceeds more difficult to trace.176  This 
decision was vacated by Moreno-Gonzalez, which is one in the group of 
cases that the Supreme Court reversed and remanded after Cuellar.177  The 
Supreme Court did not explain its reasoning except for attributing the 
decision to its recent Cuellar decision.  The most probable explanation is 
that the Eleventh Circuit looked at the objective effect of the act instead of 
the defendant’s purpose.  The court found that the defendants hiding the 
money in cars was an attempt to conceal the money and the plan allowed 
them to place the money in the hands of a third party, which made it 
difficult to determine both the owner and source of the money, and as a 
result, a jury could conclude that the defendants had engaged in 
 
 170.  See supra note 129 (listing cases vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court in 
light of Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008)). 
 171.  United States v. Ness, 466 F.3d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 172.  United States v. Ness, 565 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 173.  Id. at 78. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  United States v. Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d 1311, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 177.  Moreno-Gonzalez v. United States, 128 U.S. 2901 (2008). 
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concealment money laundering.178  There was no mention of whether the 
design of the defendants’ actions was meant to conceal, and it therefore 
failed the Cuellar standard. 
There are also cases that were not explicitly overturned by Cuellar but 
would most likely come out differently if they were decided today.  For 
example, in United States v. Johnson, the issue regarding concealment 
money laundering was whether the defendant depositing illicit proceeds 
into his mother’s account was for the purpose of concealing the origins of 
that money.179  The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the defendant’s money laundering convictions 
because the government presented “no evidence of unusual secrecy, 
questionable structuring, highly irregular features of the transfers, or 
multiple movements of the same funds that assisted in concealing their 
original source.  Nothing about these transfers suggests that [the defendant] 
attempted to avoid detection or attention.”180  However, once again, there 
was no explanation of the “why” and the decision only focused on the 
“how.”  By only focusing on the transaction itself, the court gave basically 
no weight to what the purpose of the transaction might have been.  
Therefore, this case would have most likely come out the other way had it 
been decided after Cuellar. 
Two Eighth Circuit cases that were both discussed in Part II, United 
States v. Norman and United States v. Bowman, would also have different 
results post-Cuellar.  In Norman, the court reasoned that the point was 
whether the defendant made the funds more difficult to trace by using illicit 
proceeds to purchase a car.181  However, Cuellar tells us that the point is 
not whether an action actually makes funds more difficult to trace, but 
whether that was the defendant’s purpose.  The Norman decision remains 
good law, yet the decision does not enlighten us as to what the “why” was.  
Similarly, in Bowman, the defendant put illegal proceeds into his 
girlfriend’s account, which she then used for personal expenses.182  The 
court found that this transformation showed concealment.183  Once again, 
without actually pointing to any evidence in the record, the court inferred 
that the defendant’s actions were designed to conceal.  These decisions 
were problematic then and remain problematic now.  First, they do not 
satisfy the Cuellar standard.  Second, both Norman and Bowman interpret 
buying goods with illicit proceeds as money laundering when the statute 
 
 178.  Garcia-Jaimes, 484 F.3d at 1322 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 179.  United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 180.  Id. at 1291-92. 
 181.  United States v. Norman, 143 F.3d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 182.  United States v. Bowman, 235 F.3d 1113, 1116 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 183.  Id. 
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explicitly does not cover money spending.  This issue is explored more in 
depth in Part V, subsection 3. 
There are, of course, many other cases that one could list to 
demonstrate Cuellar’s impact.  The primary takeaway is that Cuellar 
significantly altered the standard against which concealment money 
laundering cases are judged and would theoretically impact a great deal of 
preceding case law. 
B. What Has Remained the Same Post-Cuellar 
1. Concealment Through Structuring 
Showing that a defendant structured transactions is one way that the 
government has successfully demonstrated concealment.  After Cuellar, 
there continues to be a trend of convicting individuals for concealment 
money laundering because of their transaction structuring.  There is no 
monetary limit under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and a prosecutor could 
theoretically charge a defendant for laundering even a penny under this 
statute.  Transaction structuring is controlled by the statute 31 U.S.C. § 
5324, although there is a structuring provision in section 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).  
Financial institutions are required to report any transactions over $10,000, 
and it is a criminal act to structure transactions, such as breaking up a 
single transaction above the threshold amount into multiple transactions, 
for the purpose of evading reporting requirements.184  Even though 
structuring offenses could be charged through § 1956, courts have found 
transaction structuring to be indicative of concealment and instead affirmed 
convictions based on the concealment portion of the statute. 
In United States v. Williams, the defendant was found guilty of a drug 
conspiracy during which he structured transactions.185  The defendant 
claimed that he structured his transactions in order to avoid reporting 
requirements, not to launder money.186  The government argued that his 
structuring was itself evidence of the defendant’s design to conceal.187  In 
addition, the defendant used bank accounts in his own name and with 
fictitious names to negotiate structured deposits in order to avoid law 
enforcement attention regarding the nature and source of his funds.188  This 
 
 184.  31 U.S.C. § 5324(a) (2014). 
 185.  United States v. Williams, 605 F.3d 556, 560, 564 (8th Cir. 2010), rehearing and 
rehearing en banc denied, No. 4:11-CV-02059-RWS, 2012 WL 6216790, at *8 (E.D. Mo. 
Dec. 13, 2012). 
 186.  Id. at 564. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. at 566. 
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caused the Eighth Circuit to go into a detailed analysis and application of 
other cases under the Cuellar standard since why the money was hidden 
was more important than the mere fact that it was hidden.189 
The Williams court first cited and discussed a Fifth Circuit case, 
United States v. Brown, which discussed Cuellar in depth and applied the 
Cuellar standard.190  In Brown, the defendants were pharmacists convicted 
of a compilation of offenses, including money laundering arising from their 
distribution of medication using false prescriptions.191  The government 
proved concealment money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) by 
demonstrating that some of the defendants made payments for illegal 
prescription drugs in structured cash transactions.192  The Fifth Circuit held 
that the government’s evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Cuellar 
standard because the defendants “intended to and did make it more difficult 
for the government to trace and demonstrate the nature of these funds.”193  
The aspects of “classic” money laundering that were present included the 
fact that the transactions were in cash so that they were not easily tracked 
and that most of the deposits were below ten thousand dollars so as to 
avoid triggering any reporting requirements that might lead to unwanted 
attention regarding the details of the money.194  Importantly, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that “[s]ome of this behavior could also be reached by the 
‘structuring’ provisions of the money laundering statute, . . . but the 
government charged concealment and has produced sufficient evidence to 
support those charges.”195 
The Williams court also found a Fourth Circuit case, United States v. 
Villarini, to be instructive.196  In Villarini, the defendant embezzled 
$83,000, which she thereafter deposited in structured amounts into a bank 
account that she opened.197  The three deposits in question ranged in 
amounts from $1,000 to $2,200.198  Like the defendant in Brown, the 
defendant here argued that the Government had insufficient evidence to 
sustain her money laundering conviction.199  While the court addressed that 
the defendant could also have been charged through the structuring 
provision under § 1056(a)(1)(B)(ii), it found that the fact the defendant 
 
 189.  Id. at 565. 
 190.  United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 787 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 191.  Id. at 773, 775. 
 192.  Id. at 787. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  United States v. Williams, 605 F.3d 556, 565 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 197.  United States v. Villarini, 238 F.3d 530, 532 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 198.  Id.  
 199.  Id. 
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made four transactions “at two-to-four-week intervals, gives rise to a 
reasonable inference that the transactions were designed to avoid suspicion 
or to give the appearance that she had a legitimate income stream.”200 
Thus, following Brown and Villarini, the Eighth Circuit found that the 
evidence in Williams was sufficient to prove concealment under the 
Cuellar standard.201  It reasoned that: 
Depositing money as cash with a fictitious name as the purchaser 
does more than “merely hide” the money from reporting 
requirements; we hold that a reasonable jury could find that [the 
defendant]’s intent was to conceal the nature of the funds.  If [the 
defendant]’s only goal was to avoid reporting requirements, there 
would be no need to use a fictitious name.  The use of [a fake 
name] demonstrates that [the defendant] wanted not only to 
shield himself from reporting requirements but also to actively 
conceal the nature or source of the funds.202 
The use of fictitious names appears to have been what pushed the 
Eighth Circuit over the edge regarding design to conceal.  It distinguished 
this case from its previous decision in United States v. Herron where the 
defendants wired proceeds of a drug operation to their own bank accounts 
using non-structured amounts.203  The defendants in Herron used their own 
names when sending the money, and “there is no evidence to suggest that 
the money was received by any persons other than those named in the . . . 
records.”204  Therefore, there was no effort to conceal since the defendants 
merely moved illegal proceeds from one place to another and were not 
trying to disguise the source or ownership of the funds.  This made the case 
distinguishable from Williams because in Williams, the defendant took 
affirmative steps toward concealing the nature and source of the funds by 
adopting fictitious names.205  Thus, a reasonable jury could conclude that 
the defendant was not just “hiding” money but in fact designing the scheme 
to disguise the source of the money.206 
It should be noted that Villarini was decided in 2001, which was long 
before Cuellar.  Therefore, courts’ acceptance of transaction structuring as 
a form of concealment money laundering is not a recent development.  
However, it is one of the areas that has not seemed to be significantly 
impacted by the Cuellar decision since courts will still readily accept 
 
 200.  Id. at 533. 
 201.  Williams, 605 F.3d at 566. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  United States v. Herron, 97 F.3d 234, 236-37 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 204.  Id. at 237. 
 205.  Williams, 605 F.3d at 566-67. 
 206.  Id. at 567. 
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structuring as sufficient to demonstrate a purpose to conceal. 
C. Implications for the Cuellar Standard 
The Cuellar standard seems to be here to stay.  In 2009, in response to 
the financial crisis, Congress passed the Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act 
(FERA), which added additional crimes to the criminal code.207  Prior to the 
statute’s passage, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL) anticipated that some members of the House Judiciary 
Committee would introduce their own bills concerning fraud and money 
laundering, so the NACDL put forth extensive and persistent efforts to 
educate Capitol Hill on FERA’s problematic provisions.208  Various bills 
were introduced regarding the various topics covered by FERA including 
Representative Lungren’s Money Laundering Correction Act of 2009, 
which actually went against the NACDL’s interests.209  This act sought to 
legislatively reverse United States v. Santos and Cuellar.210  If passed, the 
act would have amended the federal criminal code to allow a conviction for 
money laundering based on merely concealing or disguising monetary 
instruments and would have expanded the concept of monetary proceeds to 
include gross receipts.211  The final bill was signed into law on May 20, 
2009 and did not contain a legislative reversal of Cuellar but did 
legislatively reverse Santos.212  As a result, Cuellar remains good law and 
the standard dictated in that case will continue to be followed by the courts 
for the foreseeable future. 
D. The Application of Cuellar Remains Unclear 
A number of recently decided cases highlight the inconsistencies in 
applying the Cuellar standard among various courts. 
In United States v. Rey, the Third Circuit appeared to have reverted 
 
 207.  The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 
1617.  
 208.  Tiffany M. Joslyn, FERA’s Silver Lining – An Account of NACDL’s Efforts 
Combating Overcriminalization, 33 CHAMPION 55 (2009). 
 209.  H.R. 1793, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 210.  Id.  See also United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (holding that 
“proceeds” of criminal activities applies only to criminal profits and not gross receipts); 
Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 568 (2008) (holding that in order to sustain a 
concealment money laundering conviction, the government must show that a defendant 
intended to conceal illegal proceeds and the concealment was not merely the logical result 
of a defendant’s actions). 
 211.  H.R. 1793, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 212.  Joslyn, supra note 208, at 56. 
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back to the pre-Cuellar ways and allowed courts to draw even stronger 
conclusions regarding intent from relatively ambiguous evidence.213  The 
defendant in Rey was the CEO of a company who swindled individuals into 
investing in her company by telling them that the company traded in 
currencies, commodities, and precious stones.214  She also told them that 
their funds were guaranteed, that they would never leave the firm’s bank 
account, and that they would receive their principal back no matter what.215  
In reality, the defendant transferred funds from the company’s bank 
accounts to several other bank accounts for her own purposes.216  The 
government offered evidence that the defendant transferred investors’ 
funds to the Hong Kong bank accounts in the name of corporations that had 
no apparent ties to the defendant’s company.217  The money was never 
invested but either spent or transferred back to individuals in the United 
States, thereby concealing the location of the funds.218  The Third Circuit 
reasoned that a jury could infer that the defendant wanted it to be difficult 
for investors to discover the Hong Kong corporations and could also infer 
that the defendant wired the funds for purposes of concealing the money 
before it was spent or re-routed back to the defendant and her co-
conspirators in the United States.219  Given this evidence, the court found 
that “there was ample evidence to support [the defendant]’s conviction for 
international money laundering.”220  The Third Circuit thus appears to 
support a standard that enables courts to make inferences much like they 
did before Cuellar and deviate from the announced test. 
The First Circuit displayed a similar level of generosity in United 
States v. Ledee.221  In Ledee, a brother and sister were charged with 
multiple bankruptcy-related crimes allegedly designed to conceal the 
brother’s assets in order to avoid his obligations to creditors.222  The brother 
transferred property to the name of a corporation which he also owned.223  
He did not disclose this transaction when he filed for bankruptcy and also 
lied to creditors about the property’s ownership.224  The illegal transaction 
itself involved converting payments into eight cashier’s checks that were 
 
 213.  United States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 153 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 214.  Id.  
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 156. 
 218.  Id. at 153. 
 219.  Id. at 156. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  United States v. Ledee, 772 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 222.  Id. at 25. 
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 224.  Id. at 25-26. 
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payable to four individuals who had no financial interest in the transaction 
or the corporation.225  On appeal, the defendants asserted that the 
government failed to show that the money was derived from unlawful 
activity and that they intended to conceal the money.226  The First Circuit 
concluded that “[t]his claim warrants little discussion” since the evidence 
supported a finding that the defendant initiated a “sham sale . . . and 
arranged the convoluted handling of the proceeds, to further his earlier 
fraudulent transfer and concealment of the property.”227  This is the only 
explanation that the court provides.  While the evidence is undoubtedly 
suspicious, given that the Cuellar standard is so restrictive, it seems rather 
casual for the court to state one of the major issues on appeal warrants 
limited discussion.  By simply stating that the evidence is sufficient, the 
First Circuit gives no guidance on how to interpret future cases. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Courts have always cared about the intent of the defendant.  Indeed, 
the money laundering statute itself requires that the defendant know that 
the transaction is designed in whole or in part “to conceal or disguise the 
nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the 
proceeds of specified unlawful activity[.]”228  However, under the Cuellar 
standard, the government must now show that concealment was one of the 
defendant’s ultimate purposes and not just an effect. 
A. Courts Should Continue to Look At the Traditional Indicators of 
Concealment 
As previously discussed, traditional indicators of concealment include: 
[S]tatements by a defendant probative of intent to conceal; 
unusual secrecy surrounding the transaction; structuring the 
transaction in a way to avoid attention; depositing illegal profits 
in the bank account of a legitimate business; highly irregular 
features of the transaction; using third parties to conceal the real 
owner; a series of unusual financial moves cumulating in the 
transaction; or expert testimony on practices of criminals.229 
Money laundering case law is an area where there is not a lot of uniformity.  
 
 225.  Id. at 27-28. 
 226.  Id. at 35. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 229.  United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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Yet courts agree that these situations are ones where there is a strong 
indication of intent to conceal.  Courts need to take advantage of uniformity 
where they can get it.  I am not suggesting that if a specific fact pattern fits 
into one of these categories there should be a presumption of concealment.  
However, it should definitely be a factor that carries weight in the ultimate 
deliberation.  Using this as a starting point also should not raise concerns 
about blanket applications of guilt or innocence.  Money laundering cases 
tend to be very fact-specific given the clever schemes that conspirators 
attempt to develop.  Because of this characteristic of money laundering 
cases, courts will still inevitably have to analyze the specific circumstances 
in fine detail before turning to the backdrop of case law. 
B. Courts Ought to Allow Circumstantial Evidence to Show Intent As 
Long As the Government Can Also Point to Concrete Evidence to 
Support Its Claims 
Some courts have been relatively generous regarding their definition 
of intent by allowing juries to infer intent from circumstantial evidence.  
This approach seems arbitrary.  For example, in Rey, the Third Circuit 
allowed the inference that the defendant wanted it to be difficult for the 
investors to trace the funds to the companies in Hong Kong and wired the 
money to those companies for the purpose of concealing the funds.230  This 
type of inference asks courts to prod into multiple layers of a defendant’s 
mind without concrete evidence.  It is understandably difficult to prove 
subjective intent.  However, Cuellar specifically tells courts that it is not 
whether an act conceals that matters, but it is the intent of the defendant 
that is most significant.231  Indeed, the facts in Rey do not appear any 
stronger than the facts in Ness, which the Second Circuit held failed the 
Cuellar standard.232  In Ness, the court found that the defendant avoiding a 
paper trail, hiding the proceeds in packages of jewelry, and using code 
words was only enough to show the “how,” but not the “why.”233  Yet, 
wiring funds abroad is apparently enough to show a design to conceal in 
the Third Circuit.234 
A more ideal approach would be one where a court looks at the 
affirmative steps that a defendant took to conceal his or her proceeds.235  
 
 230.  United States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 231.  Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550, 566 (2008). 
 232.  United States v. Ness, 565 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  United States v. Rey, 595 F. App’x 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 235.  See United States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1177 (11th Cir. 2005) (examining 
several unusual things the defendant did in order to conceal the cash flow from his drug 
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The use of affirmative steps would be an objective way to assess a 
subjective criterion.  While some circumstantial evidence is stronger than 
others, by allowing juries or judges to infer purposefulness from indirect 
evidence, courts are not staying true to the Supreme Court’s mandate in 
Cuellar.  Justice Alito suggested in his Cuellar concurrence that the 
government can show inferred intent through evidence that a specific 
action can have a concealing effect and that the defendant knew the action 
would have this type of effect.236  I agree with Justice Alito and provide a 
similar recommendation.  If an action is objectively known to have 
concealing effects, the reliance on circumstantial evidence becomes more 
concrete.  As previously discussed, money laundering cases tend to be very 
fact specific, thus making it difficult to develop one uniform standard.  
However, by allowing this combination of circumstantial evidence and 
objectively known effects, courts would have a benchmark that allows for 
less subjective decisions and can be applied to a wide array of fact patterns. 
Consider the following hypothetical set of facts.  The defendant is a 
drug dealer who had a habit of hiring people to collect drug proceeds on his 
behalf and then had them deposit the proceeds in a bank account under the 
name of a company not associated with the drug dealer.  This behavior is 
obviously objectively suspicious, but this evidence alone would not satisfy 
the Cuellar standard of showing the “why” and not just the “how.”  
However, the government then calls a witness, who happens to also be a 
reformed drug dealer, to testify that it is common practice for drug dealers 
to hire someone else to pick up drug sale proceeds and then deposit them in 
an unassociated account for the purposes of concealing the funds.  This 
would seem to satisfy Justice Alito’s request for more specific evidence of 
inferred intent.  Not only is the behavior indicative of concealment, but in 
this case, the government would have pointed to specific evidence that 
would help a trier of fact infer that the defendant knew his actions would 
conceal the illicit proceeds. 
C. Courts Need to Follow Cuellar More Strictly 
In many ways, Cuellar imposes a heavy burden for prosecutors to 
meet.  Apart from a defendant saying that they were trying to “conceal the 
nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the illicit proceeds,”237 
how realistic is it that the government can point to evidence in the record 
that conclusively demonstrates intent to conceal?  Justice Alito in Cuellar 
would allow the use of circumstantial evidence, but his opinion was a 
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concurrence and also dicta.  Nonetheless, despite Cuellar’s shortcomings, it 
is still necessary for lower courts to follow its mandate to focus on the 
“why” of a defendant’s actions and not just the “how.” 
The Supreme Court is still supreme and stare decisis requires that 
Cuellar continue to be followed.  Money laundering has an international 
reach and impacts the economy at the national level.238  We do not want 
different circuit courts applying different standards for a plethora of 
reasons.  For one, money laundering cases should turn on the facts of each 
scenario, not procedural nuances regarding where the case is tried.  It is 
also unfair to defendants that they could be acquitted in one state while 
convicted in another when the Supreme Court has already set out a 
standard under which the government failed to meet its burden.  As long as 
Cuellar remains good law, lower courts need to follow it until another case 
comes along. 
Furthermore, Cuellar provides a check in preventing the money 
laundering statute from becoming a money spending statute.  The standard 
becomes more difficult to apply in more complicated transactions with 
multiple intermediate steps.  For example, the Eighth Circuit found 
sufficient design to conceal in Norman when the defendant bought a Range 
Rover in his business’s name.239  While this decision is problematic 
because it infers intent from spending illicit proceeds, the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning that the defendant bought the car in order to make it more 
difficult for the true owner of the money to trace what had happened to it 
does point to specific steps that the defendant took in order to conceal or 
disguise the location of the money.  As discussed previously, purchasing 
goods with illegal funds is not chargeable under the money laundering 
statute, but if that purchase was made for the purposes of concealing those 
funds, then there would be a valid case for concealment money laundering.  
This can be seen in Garcia-Emanuel, where virtually every purchase was 
deemed insufficient to convict the defendant for concealment money 
laundering except for those goods that he put in his wife’s name to deceive 
the IRS.240  The question that remains is how to weigh the purchase against 
the intermediate steps in determining whether there was sufficient design to 
conceal.  There must be some limit or the courts risk turning the statute into 
a money spending statute, which Congress has explicitly rejected.  Courts 
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ought to follow the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Garcia-Emanuel and only 
find design to conceal when there is concrete evidence to support that 
proposition.  Taking affirmative steps to transform funds into a different 
form is absolutely circumstantial evidence of a design to conceal.  It would 
be difficult for any defendant to argue that moving funds between multiple 
bank accounts before ultimately purchasing a house would be for any other 
purpose other than to conceal the source, location, or ownership of those 
funds.  For example, Magluta would probably still be decided the same 
way today because funneling money through so many channels to pay 
attorney fees would appear more than objectively suspicious.241  Why 
would an individual go through so many people, countries, and bank 
accounts to pay his attorney fees when he could just write and mail a check 
himself?  Even if he was not trying to conceal illicit funds, the facts make it 
seem pretty obvious that the defendant in Magluta was concealing 
something.  It was not the spending of tainted funds, here to pay attorney 
fees, that was problematic but how that money reached the attorney that 
raised eyebrows. 
However, when the circumstantial evidence of concealment is 
comprised solely of a defendant’s purchases, those actions appear to fall 
outside the scope of the statute.  The government could always try to get 
around this requirement by charging a defendant with promotion or 
conspiracy to money launder instead since concealment money laundering 
is not the only money laundering charge.  Therefore, prosecutors may be 
better off charging as many different types of money laundering as the facts 
allow so that they do not remain pigeonholed to the strict standards for 
concealment charges. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are certain acts, such as using third parties to conceal the real 
owner of funds or assets, which are traditionally associated with “classic” 
concealment money laundering.  However, many examples that courts 
point to as evidence of a purpose to conceal are only that—evidence.  This 
can be seen by the jurisdictional differences in how courts have addressed 
this issue with respect to cases in which the defendant placed funds or car 
titles in another’s name.  The Cuellar decision did not change the red flags 
that alert courts to concealment money laundering, but it has concentrated 
the focus on the subjective intent of the defendant rather than whether an 
act could have the potential to conceal.  This standard still leaves a good 
deal of discretion for courts to determine whether a defendant acted with 
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the requisite purpose.  It also has not unfairly altered the burden of proof 
that the government must prove in order to obtain money laundering 
convictions.  Thus, Cuellar has not really changed the money laundering 
game.  It has not even really changed the rules.  What Cuellar has changed 
is the objective of proof at trial, and lower courts need to recognize this 
rather than continue to follow their own whims.  Courts may continue to 
search for the traditional indicators of concealment money laundering but 
they ought to point to the most concrete evidence and follow Cuellar’s 
mandate more strictly. 
 
